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Atauro prisoners appeal for help 
An urgent plea for help was handed over secretly by political 
prisoners on Atauro prison island in East Timar to a visiting 
Portuguese television team during a trip to East Timor in Feb-
ruary this year. Some of the prisoners whispered, "They're trying 
to get rid of us". One prisoner, at enormous risk to himself, 
succeeded in pulling a journalist aside and stuffing into his hands 
a list of 116 names of people who disappeared in Lospalos and 
have not been heard of since 1980. (See page 3 . ) 
The Portuguese journalist, Rui Araujo described how he 
received the list of names as follows: 
A trembling hand grabs hold of me and pulls me into a hut. A man who 
is sweating all over takes some paper out of his pocket; the paper is 
damp and crumpled. He gives it to me without saying a word. We leave 
the place slowly. (ABC journal, April/May 1983) 
Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez, Bishop of Dili, who was replaced this 
month. " ... a symbol against Indonesian oppression," wrote The Times, 
London. 
The Portuguese television team's experiences during its visit to 
Atauro and to other parts of East Timor give the lie to claims 
made by Indonesian officials and uncritically repeated by other 
journalists who have been able to visit East Timor recently. For 
example, the Australian journalist, John Hamilton who visited 
East Timor a few weeks after Araujo, confined his report about 
Atauro to information provided by the military commander of 
the prison island, Artillery Captain A.K. SaMjono, and the 
island's chief-of-police, Lieutenant R. Lili Soetisna. According 
to these two representatives of Indonesian power, quoted un-
critically by Hamilton, the prisoners on Atauro are people "who 
don't want to fight any more". He quotes Captain Sardjono as 
telling him: 
The people here just want to develop their gardens. There is a plan to 
close Atauro down this year, but many of the people say they want to 
stay here. They like it better than the villages they come from. (West 
Australian, 5th May, 1983) 
Araujo, being Portuguese, was able, though under extremely 
difficult conditions, to speak to Timorese people direct, without 
the intermediary of an interpretor. By contrast, his report about 
A tauro in addition to describing the secret encounters, also reads 
as follows: 
"They are trying to get rid of us," someone says. In the makeshift tent 
of the Indonesian Red Cross, I see a little boy fall and drop two tins of 
food containing a little maize and some pieces of fish; the food had 
been brought there by helicopter the day before. 
"They are trying to get rid of us," repeats another voice just behind me. 
The atmosphere is quite dreadful, killing. I think to myself: all this 
misery is caused by hunger and despair. People look bewildered. The 
children never smile. 
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Readers' Letters 
Militarisation and the 
Unitary State 
I am writing to exress my appreciation for 
the continuing excellent coverage your 
magazine is giving to human and political 
right violations in Indonesia. At the same 
time I would also like to draw your readers' 
attention to certain conclusions that can be 
drawn from the materials published in your 
magazine. 
First, the massive violations of human, 
political and cultural rights by the Indo-
nesian regime are so ignored by most West-
ern news media that one suspects they are 
in fact covering up such violations as a 
matter of policy. Second, the Western 
governments, especially members of the 
IGGI, are subsidising the Suharto regime 
with the care and eagerness befitting Indo-
nesia's new status as their common colony, 
with utter disregard for the misdeeds of this 
regime. Third, this support is not limited to 
finance but extends to military equipment 
and training for the massive military estab-
lishment that has been reponsible for all the 
atrocities. 
Fourth, the coverage also shows that 
Indonesia is in fact not a political commun-
ity with the usual assumptions for a nation-
state, but a multinational collection of dis-
parate cultural and political communities, 
sometimes thousands of miles apart, with-
out a common language, history, culture 
and interests, that have been forced to-
gether into one hodge-podge, previously by 
the armed forces of Dutch colonialism and 
today by the armed forces ot Javanese 
colonialism. In fact there is no other way to 
enforce a unitary state system on such a far-
flung empire than by force of arms. I sug-
gest that the "original sin" was in the 
attempt at all costs to keep the former mult-
inational Dutch colonial empire as a single 
"national" state under the new label of 
"Indonesia". Such a state cannot be kept as 
one except by the use of naked force. 
Without a military regime, Indonesia 
cannot be kept as one state. There is no 
other basis for unity. Therefore, those who 
insist on one Indonesia but oppose the mili-
tary dictatorship are not seriously facing 
the problem. The plea for a democratic, 
demilitarized Indonesian state is wishful 
thinking, a contradiction in terms, as long 
as the territorial integrity of the Dutch 
colonial empire, without decolonization, is 
insisted upon. Democracy can only be 
established in Indonesia by properly 
decolonizing this Dutch colonial empire as 
has been done everywhere else with colon-
ial empires, by returning each separate 
colonial territory to the rightful peoples -
not to the Javanese generals. Only then can 
a proper democratic process of government 
be organized and genuine local self-govern-
ment be affected. The bogey of the result-
ant mushrooming of mini-states in the 
2 
region exists only in Javanese colonialist 
minds. 
I am impressed with your fairness after I 
read the letter of Mr. Klemens Ludwig 
published in your issue No 55 correcting the 
false allegation voiced in some quarters to 
the effect that the South Moluccan freedom 
fighters are not genuine seekers of self-
determination but merely "separatists". 
Such an accusation has also been levelled at 
the National Liberation Front of Acheh 
Sumatra for demanding our legitimate right 
to self-determination and for rejecting 
Javanese Indonesian colonialism. There-
fore I doubly appreciate the letter of Mr. 
Ludwig and your fairness in publishing it. 
Students and 
Passports 
Sincerely yours, 
Husaini M. Hasan, 
Uppsala, Sweden 
Please note the following corrections to 
"Indonesian Students Could Lose Pass-
ports", in TAPOL Bulletin No. 56, March 
1983: 
1. Fatichin and I are functionaries not of 
PI (Perhimpunan Indonesia - Indone-
sian Association) but of PPI ( Perhimpu-
nan Pela jar Indonesia) - Indonesian 
Students' Association). I am also an 
active member of PI (Perhimpunan 
Indonesia) in West Berlin. Whereas PPI 
has branches everywhere, PI only exists 
in West Berlin. I was on the Executive 
of the West German PPI up to March, 
1983. 
2. Regarding the P4 Penataran and the P4 
I walked out of the P4 Penataran (In-
doctrination Course) in Hunsruck in 
March 1981. This was a nation-wide 
course and lasted for 16 days. The Indo-
nesian embassy tried to make PPI-West 
Berlin participate in a week-long P4 
Penataran held in Berlin in January 
1982. The West Berlin PPI refused to do 
so and I was accused of "controlling" 
the chairman of the West Berlin PPI on 
that occasion. 
P4 is the acronym for Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Panca-
sila (Guidance for Living By, and Serv-
ing the Pancasila) which was formulated 
by a Decision of the Peoples' Assembly 
(MPR) in 1978. There are however var-
ious ways to implement the P4. P4 
courses are given in organisations, in 
schools, in the family, in the political 
parties and so on. In the case of govern-
ment employees, these courses are 
called P4 Penataran. 
Pipit Rochiyat, 
West Berlin 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 57. May 1983 
The Democracy 
Debate Continues 
Evidently (see Tapol Bulletin No. 56/March 
1983: 13), Hadjar confuses two things: 
principles and specificities. 
Let us refresh our memories: Hadjar 
(see Tapol Bulletin No. 55/Jan. 1983: 19, 
20) makes general claims which even in 
principle I find so obscure that it prompted 
me to seek clarification. Since even as prin-
ciples they are so vague (at least to me), I 
do not think we can seriously proceed into 
the realm of specificities. Achmad Wahib's 
book, setting out his personal ideas, ob-
viously belongs to the second category. 
Had jar neither clarifies his group's position 
on "democracy" (even in principle) nor 
convinces me that Wahib's personal views 
should be equated to the Indonesian Mus-
lims' corporate principles of "democracy". 
For these reasons I do not see why one has 
to read Wahib's book first in order to quest-
ion Hadjar's general principles. For these 
reasons I likewise consider his muddle 
about the "bourgeoisie'', "working class'', 
and "democratic" (sic; again, unqualified) 
or "social" revolutions not directly rele-
vant. All the same, even if we ignore his 
palpable confusion between general prin-
ciples and specificities, my original quest-
ion on his "democracy" remains unanswer-
ed. 
Finally, I am prepared to continue this 
dialogue only if Hadjar sticks as near to 
"fair play" as possible. I am neither equip-
ped nor willing to plunge to the depth that 
he is evidently dragging this discussion. If 
he disputes my observation that only the 
Marxists have a clear-cut programme for 
achieving democracy for the majority of 
our people - peddlars, stall-holders, the 
majority of wage earners as well as small 
peasants (as opposed to big, mostly Muslim 
be it noted, landlords)- then why not say 
so, and produce the evidence? Why put 
words into my mouth? Wild allegations 
such as his , that I quote "the terrifying 
Stalinist dogma", is not only gratuitous but 
also likely to cloud the issues at hand even 
further than he has already done. 
A.R. T. Kemasang, 
London, England 
T APOL welcomes letters from read-
ers and hopes to continue its series of 
Guest Column articles. Signed art-
icles do not necessarily express views 
with which TAPOL can agree; they 
are published in order to promote 
discussion of issues relevant to devel-
opments in Indonesia today. 
Readers' letters must be kept 
reasonably short, otherwise cuts will 
have to be made because space is 
limited. 
All letters should be related to 
human rights problems with which 
T APOL is concerned. 
The document given to Roi Araujo consists of three handwritten sheets of paper, each with forty lines giving 
names, ages, villages, occupations and/or backgrounds. There are a total of 116 names divided into three 
sheets, two of which - the first and the third - are shown here (from 1-40 and 81-116). After being used, 
these documents will be sent to Amnesty International head office in London, which will do everything 
possible to discover the whereabouts of these 116 people. 
ABC (Lisbon) April/May 1983 
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East Timor 
Continued from page I 
Secret Agents Constantly Present 
Araujo refers repeatedly in his article to the constant presence 
and watchfulness of secret agents who kept close to his team 
throughout the visit and even followed them into their hotel 
bedroom. To get the chance to look at the written messages that 
had been passed on to him and another member of his team, they 
had to retreat to the privacy of the bathroom. The hotel entrance, 
he writes, "was guarded by three official jeeps ... which means 
that it was impossible for anyone to leave without their 
knowing." (The Resende Hotel where they stayed is the hotel 
used for the accommodation of all foreign guests.) 
Depo Provera being Used to Reduce the Timorese Population 
Araujo brought to light information about Indonesian plans "to 
reduce the population" of Timor through birth control. They 
claim, he said, that the aim is to "reduce hardship''. (Yet 
'hardship' can hardly describe adequately the terrible plight that 
has befallen the people ofTimor since the Indonesian invasion in 
1975 which has already decimated the population.) 
The population reduction programme is being implemented, 
Araujo reports, by means of injecting women with the contra-
ceptive, Depo Provera, a contraceptive that has been banned in 
the USA because of its potentially dangerous side-effects. 
The population do not welcome this initiative at all. They regard family 
planning as a menace, as something that goes against the values and 
convictions of the Timorese people. They have a deep love of children. 
Families with fewer than ten children are the exception, but this. does 
not mean that Timor is over-populated. 
(Editor's note: We hope to be able to reproduce much longer 
extracts from Rui Araujo's article in the next issue of TAPOL 
Bulletin.) 
Bishop replaced 
Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez, the Apostolic Administrator of 
the Catholic church in East Timor, usually referred to as the 
Bishop of Dili, has been replaced by Carlos Ximenes Belo, a 
priest from the Salesian Order. Father Belo was installed at a 
ceremony in Dili by Mgr Pablo Puente, the Vatican's Pro Nuncio 
in Jakarta, a few days after Mgr da Costa Lopez is said to have 
'resigned' on 10th May. 
The former Bishop whom The Times describes as a "symbol 
against Indonesian oppression" (The Times, London, 16th May, 
1983), has for a long time been the target of a deliberate 
campaign by the Indonesian authorities to discredit him. It was 
late in 1981 that Mgr da Costa Lopez succeede~ in sending out 
information about potential famine conditions and also reported 
the massacre of more than 500 Timorese at a holy shrine near 
Lacluta, during the course of the Keamanan Operation carried 
out in 1981. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 49, January 1982) 
Shortly after this news hit the world's press, Gough Whitlam, 
former Prime Minister of Australia, and Peter Hastings, Foreign 
Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, visited East Timor. In 
their reports, they used terms such as 'wicked' and 'mischievous' 
to discredit the Bishop. (See TAPOL Bulletin No. 50, March 
1982) Only recently, another Australian journalist, John 
Hamilton, writing for West Australian, reports how he had been 
told by Indonesians that the Bishop was 'difficult'. 
Jakarta radio, reporting the Bishop's replacement, said that it 
would facilitate relations with the Vatican over East Timor's 
integration into Indonesia. This may be intended to imply that 
the way is now open for the church in Dili to be fully integrated 
into the Catholic church of Indonesia, a move which Mgr da 
Costa Lopez is known to have opposed. 
A ward for East Timor Article 
Rod Nordland who writes for The Philadelphia Inquirer 
has been given a special award by the George Polk Awards 
for Journalism for his dispatches last year from South East 
Asia which included his detailed account of the plight of the 
people of East Timor, as well as reports on Cambodia and 
Vietnam. The East Timor report was published on May 
1982, and was reproduced in full in TAPOL Bulletin No 52. 
The George Polk Awards, given annually, were 
established in 1949 by Long Island University to honour 
the memory of a CBS journalist killed the previous year 
while covering the Greek civil war. 
Timor war casualties second highest in world 
In a report entitled A World at War - 1983, the Center for 
Defense Information based in Washington lists East Timor as the 
country that has suffered the second largest number of deaths in 
all wars that are currently raging world-wide. The following table 
is reproduced from the report. 
The Most Violent Conflicts 
Conflict 
1 . Kampuchea Civil War 
2. East Timor Guerrilla War 
3. Afghanistan Civil War 
4. lraq-'lran War 
5. Lebanon Civil War 
6. Philippine Guerrilla Wars 
7. China-Vietnam War 
8. Guatemala Guerrilla War 
9. El Salvador Civil War 
10. Ethiopia~Eritrea Guerrilla War 
Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information. 
The Center for Defense Information, whose Board of 
Advisors includes a number of retired US Armed Forces officers, 
businessmen and writers, including a former Deputy Director of 
the CIA, is headed by Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque 
(retired) of the US Navy. 
Number 
of Deaths 
1-4,000,000 
100-250,000 
100,000+ 
80-100,000 
80,000+ 
50-100,000 
47,000+ 
30-40,000+ 
30,000+ 
30,000+ 
Year 
Began 
1970 
1975 
1978 
1980 
1975 
1972 
1979 
1967 
1977 
1962 
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Muslim political prisoner executed 
A Muslim opponent of the Suharto military government was 
executed by firing squad in Jakarta on 13th April. This is the first 
judicial murder of a political opponent in Indonesia for several 
years and the first time the military government has killed what it 
calls a "Muslim extremist" in this way since it came to power in 
1965. Many others are under sentence of death in Indonesia for 
political reasons, Muslims as well as leftwingers. Last month's 
execution places the lives of all these men in jeapardy. 
The prisoner executed was lmran bin Muhammed Zein (32 
years) who for several years had led a Muslim congregation in 
West Java which was severely critical of the Suharto government, 
the state dogma of Panca Sila and the overall policies of the 
military government. In early 1981, the group was linked to a 
series of terrorist incidents, culminating in the hijack of a 
domestic-flight passenger plane which was forced to land in 
Bangkok. The plane was stormed by Indonesian para-
commandos, under the command of the Army's top intelligence 
officer Benny Murdani. Doubts about the true origin of the 
hijack soon emerged when it became known that although only 
four of the five hijackers were killed during the assault, the fifth 
man who was taken alive and apparently unharmed was dead by 
the next day when all five bodies were flown back to Jakarta. 
An Intelligence Frame-Up 
During Imran's trial last year, his defence lawyers, all appointed 
by the Jakarta Legal Aid Bureau, told the court they had sought 
evidence from the plane's crew and passengers, only to learn that 
they were all under orders not to talk about the incident. The 
defence argued that Imran's dissident group in West Java had 
been infiltrated by an Army intelligence agent who provoked the 
group into performing ,a number of terrorist acts against the 
Army and the police; the last of these was the 1981 hijack. The 
agent-provacateur, named in court by the defence, was himself 
murdered and the man said to have been responsible for this 
murder, a member of Imran's congregation, was subsequently 
killed while in Army custody. Defence requests to call witnesses 
during the Imran trial to testify on these matters were all rejected 
by the court as "irrelevant". (See Tapol Bulletins No. 52, July 
1982, page 6; No. 55, Jan. 1983, page 5.) 
Imran's Appeal Short-Circuited 
In addition to the serious obstructions to the defence lawyers' 
efforts to get to the bottom of this case during the trial, Imran was 
later prevented from consulting his lawyers and deprived of his 
right to use all the appeals procedures legally available to him. 
This is evident from the fact that only a month ago, when Im ran 's 
lawyers announced that his death sentence had been upheld on 
appeal by a High Court they said they would be taking the appeal 
to the Supreme Court. A week later, however, they were 
informed that Imran no longer wished to enter such an appeal 
and would take his case straight to the President, the final plea. 
The lawyers were not permitted to meet Imran to obtain confirm-
ation of this decision or assist him in the procedure. Less than a 
month later, his plea had been rejected by the President and two 
days later he was executed. 
Family Not Informed about Execution 
Imran's wife and parents have been given no official notification 
about his execution, either before of since it took place. Neither 
were they given an opportunity to have a farewell meeting with 
him, which is the accepted procedure. His wife told Tempo that 
she last met him five months before he was executed. (She herself 
was held without trial for ten months in 1981.) As for Imran's 
parents, they last had permission to visit their son a year ago, in 
May 1982, soon after he had been sentenced to death. (Tempo, 
23rd April, 1983) 
Other Death Sentence Prisoners 
The army has for several years been waging a relentless campaign 
against Muslim political activity which it now sees as the main 
potential challenge to its control of the Indonesian state. lmran's 
execution is clearly intended as a warning to the country's huge 
Muslim population which is far from happy under military rule. 
According to T APO L's records, there are four more Muslim 
prisoners under death sentence whose lives are now in jeopardy. 
They are: 
Timzar Zubil sentenced to death in 1980 in Medan, North 
Sumatra. His plea for clemency was rejected last year; a press 
report in February this year quoted a local public attorney official 
as saying that his execution was "imminent". 
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Azhar bin Muhammed Sofar, sentenced to death as a member of 
Imran's group in September 1982. Nothing is known about his 
appeals. 
Salman Hafidz, sentenced to death as a member of Imran 's group 
sometime in 1982. His appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected 
in March this year and he may now be awaiting a decision on his 
final plea. 
Maman Kuswayadi, sentenced to death as a member of Imran's 
group in April this year. 
Apart from these Muslim death-sentence prisoners, there are 
fifty or so prisoners who were sentenced to death in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s for alleged involvement in the so called "coup 
attempt" which preceded Suharto's coup against President 
Sukarno, bringing the military to power in 1965. Information 
about their position vis-a-vis appeals procedures is fragmentary 
and largely out-of-date. One man, Air Force Colonel Sudiono is 
known to have had his death sentence upheld by the President 
early last year and could be executed at any time. Others are 
known to have lost their High Court or Supreme Court appeals, 
including the trade union leaders Muhammed Munir and Ruslan 
Wijayasastra. 
Campaign Against the Death Sentence 
T APOL strongly protests against the execution of Imran and 
demands that the Indonesian government stop using the death 
sentence for political purposes. It also condemns the use by the 
Indonesian courts of the Anti-Subversion Law and calls for the 
immediate repeal of this legislation. It rejects the use of the Anti-
Subversion Law and the death sentence for purposes of political 
repression, and urges readers to prot,est, to save the lives of those 
now in danger. There is an urgent need for a resolute campaign to 
oppose and expose this repressive legislation and to expose the 
use and abuse by the Suharto military government of the law and 
the judiciary in order to eliminate all forms of political opposition. 
Timzar Zubil Executed Too? 
An unconfirmed report from Medan states that Timzar 
Zubil, sentenced to death in 1981 for "anti-government" 
activities, has already been executed. According to a report 
in the Jakarta press last February, an official of the public 
prosecutor's officer declared that his execution was 
"imminent". (See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 56, March 1983, 
page 1.) 
Government Obstructs Access: 
Lawyers protest 
Legal Aid Institute (LBH) lawyers who defended Im-ran and 
other Muslim prisoners in court have complained bitterly that 
government officials have obstructed their access to clients during 
appeals against sentence. 
Abdurahman Saleh and Moh. Asseggaf, who defended 
Imran, reported that after the High Court rejected his appeal, 
they were not granted permission to meet Imran, despite applica-
tions to KOPKAMTIB, the Regional KOPKAMTIB Officer 
(Laksusda) and the Jakarta Military Police. They were told that 
Imran did not wish to enter a plea for cassation to the Supreme 
Court, but they obtained no written notification to this effect 
from lmran himself. ''The government has violated the Pro-
cedural Code (KUHAP)," said Abdurahman. "According to 
KUHAP, the accused should have the help of a lawyer right up to 
the conclusion of his case." He complained too that such pro-
cedural violations now occur in virtually all cases in which the 
government is involved. We now face the fact, he went on, that 
officials "can claim that a convicted person has decided to dis-
pense with the services of a lawyer at the appeals stage and has 
decided to accept the court verdict." 
As for KOPKAMTIB, its cynical disregard for procedures 
was made clear in a remark by Colonel Arisandi, an official 
spokesman of KOPKAMTIB, who responded to the lawyers 
complaints by saying: "Why are they turning Imran into a hero? 
Wouldn't it be better for them to find something else to do?" 
According to Arisandi, the lawyers were in any _case at fault 
since they should have directed their application to meet their 
client to the courts, not to KOPKAMTIB. The lawyers however 
told Tempo that court officials had declared that they "needed to 
consult first with those authorities that have competence in polit-
ical affairs". 
The LBH lawyers defending two other Muslim prisoners, 
Iman Hidayat and Slamet Riyanto (sentenced respectively to 20 
and 15 years), have also been unable to meet their client, even 
though the time limit for entering a cassation plea has almost run 
out. The final date for this is 6th May. 
Source: Tempo, 7th May 1983. 
Munir's Appeal to Supreme Court 
turned down 
According to a report in a Jakarta newspaper, Mohammed Munir, 
the trade union leader who was sentenced to death in 1967, has lost 
his cassation appeal to the Supreme Court and has now entered a 
plea for clemency to President Suharto. 
It is not known whether Munir who, until 1965 was chairman of 
the mass-based trade union federation, SO BSI, is being assisted by 
a lawyer at this stage of his case. 
LAPORAN KEADAAN 
HAK ASASI MANUSIA 
DI INDONESIA 1981 
PENYUNTING' 
T. MULYA LU BIS 
FAUZI ABDULLAH 
MULYANA W.KUSUMAH 
Report on the State of Human Rights in Indonesia, 1981, published by the 
Legal Aid Institute. Just received. We hope to publish extracts and 
comments in the next issue. 
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Book Review 
Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, 
Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror, 
London, Zed Press, 1983, pp. 272. Fore-
word byW.F. Wertheim. £5 .95 paperback:" 
Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror 
provides an important analysis of the inter-
nal conditions of existence of Indonesia 's 
New Order regime, concentrating upon the 
use of the legal system as a means of domin-
ation. It presents a detaifod picture of the 
machinery of repression available to the 
ruling Suharto group, focussing upon the 
central role of the all-pervasive KOPKAM-
TIB (Operational Command for the Re-
storation of Security and Order). Being 
concerned primarily with making an inter-
nal analysis of the system, it does not ex-
tend discusson to foreign policy or Indo-
nesian involvement in East Tim or or West 
Papua New Guinea. 
The first and longest chapter examines 
the evidence for direct and indirect US 
involvement in the creation and mainte-
nance of the New Order. That there should 
have been US involvement is not in itself 
surprising: in Richard Nixon's phrase, 
Indonesia is the 'richest prize in the South 
East Asian area'. Its importance is both 
economic and geo-political, the interpene-
tration of the two aspects being symbolised 
by US reliance upon Indonesian oil during 
the Vietnam war. The importance of Indo-
nesia to US strategy is indisputable, but the 
value of the study would be considerably 
enhanced if discussion were extended, no 
matter how briefly, to the regional level. 
Indonesia may well be America's lynch pin, 
but it is also part of the wider 'island stra-
tegy' adopted after US withdrawal from 
Vietnam in 1975. As it is, many of the 
comments quoted from US statesmen 
could equally well apply to other countries 
in the region, notably the Philippines which 
in terms of purely military interests is much 
more central to US strategy. 
US economic involvement in Indonesia 
dates back to the last century, but direct 
investment becomes much more marked in 
the post-war period. Tacit support for the 
independence struggle against the Dutch 
becomes a prelude to increasing penetra-
tion of the economy and direct political 
involvement in attempts to unseat Sukarno, 
seen by the US as being at best a crypto-
communist. Both the Permesta revolt and 
the attempted coup of 1958 bear the 
hallmarks of CIA involvement. Circum-
stantial evidence further points to complic-
ity in (or at the very least knowledge of) the 
Madium affair and the 1965 Suharto coup. 
But perhaps more important for the contin-
ued existence of the New Order is the US 
role in grooming a technocratic-military 
elite: to a large extent the elaboration of 
the ideology of the armed forces 'dual 
function' at the Army Staff and Command 
School is a continuation of the CIA-backed 
*Available from TAPOL for £5.95 plus postage. 
50 pence (UK, Europe and overseas surface) or 
£3.00 (overseas airmail). 
anti-Sukarno plots. In a sense, the link 
between ABRI's* dual function and US 
strategy typifies the US-Indonesia connect-
ion. Neither dual function ideology nor the 
Suharto regime are American creations or 
imports, but the interests and ideology of 
the ruling group and US imperialism coin-
cide to such an extent that there is little or 
no contradiction between the two. 
A Ghost that Fills a Need 
Eighteen years after the wholesale mas-
sacres of 1965, Indonesia is still haunted by 
the spectre of the decimated PKI (Com-
munist Party of Indonesia). Ironically, the 
spectre is constantly conjured up by the one 
body that was meant to exorcise it once and 
for all: KOPKAMTIB, the security com-
mand set up in somewhat mysterious cir-
cumstances in 1965. As the authors demon-
strate at length, KOPKAMTIB actually 
needs the ghost of the PKI if it is to carry out 
its task of maintaining 'order' . Again and 
again, the PKI is invoked as events and 
myths are created to justify the violence of 
the regime. Only Suharto and KOPKAM-
TIB can guarantee the safety of the Repub-
lic and history is rewritten to prove it. The 
Madiun affair becomes a PKI attempt to 
take over the embattled Republic; the con-
fused events of 1965 become a PKI insur-
rection. The massacre of PKI members and 
'associates' is therefore justified. Other 
scapegoats can be used if need arises, but 
the major plank in New Order ideology 
remains the need to lay the ghost of the 
PKI. Pramoedya's Bumi Manusia is in-
dicted for 'making subtle propaganda for a 
banned ideology'. Amir Machmud can 
speak of the threat }X)sed in Aceh by the 
unlikely hybrid of 'PKI/Muslim strategy'. 
The release of B category G30S tapols in 
1979 (largely as a cosmetic measure to 
placate Western opinion) means that the 
threat is even greater. The unproven in-
·dikasi (indications) of their involvement in 
G30S are enough to justify their removal to 
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'resettlement' areas and t.heir continued 
surveillance after their return to society. 
The criterion of truth is irrelevant:' all that 
is needed is the existence of a supposed 
threat to justify repression and legitimise 
violence. If the New Order is to survive, the 
ghost must be shown to exist. This is a psy-
chotic regime in every sense of the word. 
Unfortunate Choice of Terminology 
The social model used by the authors for 
their internal analysis of the regime relies 
upon a somewhat schematic division of 
Indonesian society into three groups deter-
mined by their relationship to power: dom-
inators, collaborators and victims. The 
dominator group is small, consisting of 
Suharto's immediate associates and groups 
with the financial, security and military 
apparatuses. Its main instrument for the 
retention of power is of course the all-
pervasive KOPKAMTIB, adroitly manipu-
lating potential op}X)sition as well as 
directing open repression. KOPKAMTIB 
imposes its own special brand of martial 
law and is answerable only to the Suharto 
group itself. The dominators are not short 
of victims: their ranks include the dead of 
1965, the surviving tapols, the small 
Chinese traders murdered during the 1974 
riots, the students killed in the 1978 
demonstrations, in short the mass of the 
population. 
The social roles of victim and dominator 
are clearly defined, but the collaborator 
category is rather more ambiguous. Deli-
berate collaborators are, in effect the 
functionaries of the regime and enjoy 
limited powers and freedom from victimi-
zation. 'Critical collaborators' include 
those who, thanks to their relatively 
privileged position, can make some limited 
criticisms of the regime: lawyers, students, 
some newspaper editors and bodies such as 
the LBH (Legal Aid Institute). For the 
authors, the limited opposition of critical 
Continued on page 20 
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My experience in an Indonesian prison 
by Anwar M. Amin 
I was one of thousands of people of Acheh , Sumatra , arrested 
and tortured by the "Laksusda Kodam I" a Javanese 
gobbledegook for their gangs of torturers signifying a special 
squad stationed on my fatherland as an instrument of Javanese 
Indonesian colonialism. At the time of my arrest I was a senior 
student at the Faculty of Education, Sjiah Kuala University, at 
Kuta Radja or Bandar Acheh , and also teaching at high school in 
the district of Montasik. 
I was arrested on December 30, 1977, at my house in Bandar 
Acheh (usually misspelled by the Javanese as "Banda Aceh") by 
Lieutenant Colonel Ismael Jamani, head of Intelligence of the 
"Laksusda Kodam I", well-known as a barbarian among my 
people. I was arrested because they knew that I was among those 
who raised the flag of Acheh in front of the grand mosque of 
Kuta Radja, and at several other important places on December 
4, 1977, to commemorate the second anniversary of the 
Declaration of Independence of Acheh Sumatra . 
The Javanese authorities knew about this because Keutjhik 
Ramli Hamzah of the Free Acheh Movement, unable to control 
his enthusiasm, made a speech in a coffee shop. There were 
"'Laksusda" agents everywhere including the coffee shop where 
Keutjhik Hamzah spoke. He was arrested at gun point , and 
brought to the headquarters of the Javanese occupying forces at 
Bandar Acheh. 
A colleague badly tortured for information 
Upon arrival, he was beaten first and made to bath in his own 
blood. He was questioned when he regained consciousness after 
the beating . He gave no information, so they tortured him day 
and night with electricity, and submerged him under water until 
he lost consci1;msness; he was lashed with leather belts and 
kicked with army boots in the head and face; they stepped on his 
neck and body , until he lost consciousness. This treatment was 
repeated for so long that he broke down, and confessed to 
knowing me, Djailani Abdulla and several others. All those he 
named were arrested and tortured. Abdul Ghani was tortured 
with electricity (a gadget that seems to be a Javanese speciality): 
he was submerged under water, had cold or hot water thrown at 
him at night when he tried to sleep, was burned with cigarette 
butts, beaten with chairs until the chairs broke, was struck with 
rattan until the whip disintegrated; kicked with army boots over 
the face and trampled on all over his body . Abdul Manaf was 
given the same treatment and his testicles were crushed with 
pincers. The same treatment was given to Tengku Hadji Adam 
who lost all his teeth in the process. My friends Kasem Karo, . 
Hamn Mahmud, Djailani Abdulla received the same, if not 
worse. I had the same treatment; I do not know how I survived 
the ordeal. In addition I was a witness to the cruel treatment of 
hundreds of innocent villagers accused of being sympathisers of 
the National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra. I saw what 
happened to Tengku Dami Kamal di Tiro. He was arrested and 
then shot at until the bone of his right arm was broken. While he 
was in hospital, the Javanese troops tortured him there: they 
beat him until the bandage of his broken arm and bone opened 
and the broken bone came out of the plaster. He was 27 years 
old. Many others had limbs broken, feet, legs and bones 
shattered until the doctors had to amputate because nothing 
could be done to help. The men who perpetrated these crimes 
were soldiers, mostly Javanese officers, of "Laksusda" . 
All those imprisoned by "Laksusda" were put inside concrete 
cubicles 2 by l 1/2 meters, without any window, mattress to sleep 
on, blanket or mosquito nets . As to the quality of food, it was 
not fit for human consumption. After two months I and the 
others involved in the flag-raising affair were moved to the 
Kedah Military Prison in Bandar Acheh . 
We reported these abuses to the student organisation in 
Bandar Acheh and to the so-called Provincial House of 
Representatives set up by the Javanese Indonesian regime . We 
found ways to communicate to them . The latter paid no 
attention to our plight, but the Achehnese student organisation 
launched a strong protest to the Javanese Indonesian regime in 
Jakarta against the inhuman treatment of Achehnese political 
prisoners. These protests were sent to Suharto, the Indonesian 
Parliament in Jakarta and the Minister of Justice, but no one 
paid any attention . Instead the student leaders who signed the 
protest were soon arrested and thrown in jail together with us. 
These include Hasbi Abdullah, chairman of the student 
organisation, Hasballah MS, Zu1kifli Amin, Ustaz Hasanuddin, 
Zulfan Hasan, all members of the student council. All were 
beaten and tortured for eight months without being brought to 
the court. 
The plight of prisoners in the Kedah Military Prison was 
terrible. There were on an average about 150 political prisoners 
there, all accused as members or sympathisers of the National 
Liberation Front Acheh Sumatra . Twelve people were forced to 
live in a room 5 by 4 meters. With no toilet facility in the room, 
we were locked up 23 hours every day with half an hour in the 
morning and half an hour in the evening to wash up. Daily we 
were tortured in incredible ways : every day we were forced to 
crawl over hot sands under the burning sun . Our food ration 
consisted of a little over half a tea-cup of rice per day, with a tiny 
bit of salted fish often rotten and smelly. Sometimes we were 
given vegetables. For the three years I was in that prison, they 
never gave us adequate food and no change in our diet; we were 
never given sweet tea, a slice of cake or even half a banana. 
Every day we were forced to do hard Jabour, cleaning the 
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ho~ses, kitchen~ , gardens ~nd toilets of Javanese military 
officers; or makmg roads with our bare hands and primitive 
hoes, or preparing ground and cutting trees for a race-course for 
the Javanese officers. 
While in jail, the prisoners were often taken to the 
"Laksu~da" compound for further interrogation . They came 
back with broken arms, cut lips, bloody noses , swollen faces, 
broken legs, and many were vomiting blood. 
Knee torture 
My group of prisoners - known as the flag-raisers - were 
given special treatment on August 20, 1978, the eve of the 18th 
of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month . On that night we were 
beaten by a group of Javanese Indonesian military police . For 
reasons unknown to me, Harun Mahmud and I were singled out 
for the harshest treatment. After being beaten, we were forced 
to drink ~lcoh~I'. We refused as drinking alcohol is forbidden by 
our Mushm rehg10n. So they struck our heads and faces with the 
bottles until they were broken, cutting our heads and faces and 
making the blood pour down . Then they grabbed hold of our 
necks, pried our mouths open and poured the alcohol down our 
throats. When they released us, we vomited uncontrollably. 
Then, they forced us to lick our own vomit. We refused . Then 
they held us and they banged our heads together like rams 
fighting, beat and knocked us down until we lost consciousness. 
When we regained consciousness, they burnt our bodies with 
cigarettes. After that Harun and I were put in separate cells 
nearby. A piece of wood the size of a man's arm and about one 
meter long was put under my knees while they forced me to 
kneel down. It caused pressure on my knee joints and was very 
painful. But that was not all. To increase the pain, my tormentor 
climbed on my shoulders to add his weight , so creating greater 
pressure on my knee joints. The pressure could have disjointed 
my knee-caps. It was excruciatingly painful. The Javanese officer 
sat on my shoulders for a good half an hour. When he finally 
descended - it seemed ages to me - I could no longer stand up. 
As a result of that night's torture, my skull was damaged and 
my brain was affected. The tissues of my eyes were damaged and 
I could not see anything for over a month. I thought I had gone 
blind. My knees were so painful that I could not walk for 
months, and as a Muslim I could not pray for months because I 
could not kneel down. Harun suffered the same as me. We have 
not recovered completely until today. They gave us no medical 
treatment. 
Torturers named 
Among the torturers I could recognise were Lieutenant 
Colonel Budi Permana, chief of the Indonesian Military Police 
(CPM) "Laksusda Kodam I"; Major Djakfar, head of 
interrogation section; Major Nugraha, chief of intelligence; 
Captain Darjoto, inspector of interrogation; Captain Wahjono, 
inspector of interrogation; officer M. Nur Nanuru, interrogator; 
officer Sarwan Jacob Ali, head of Kedah Military Prison, Bandar 
Acheh; and Major Abdullah Husin, intelligence section. 
On December 14, 15, and 16, 1978, the "flag raisers group" 
were taken to the office of the High Indonesian prosecutor 
general for interrogation, then brought back to Kedah Military 
Prison. On December 17, I was taken back to the "Laksusda 
Kodam I" compound where I was questioned again by Major 
Djakfar. He said: "I have the legal right according to the 
Indonesian Constitution and given by the Indonesian 
government, to beat, torture and even murder you. Our rule is 
that all political individuals must be beaten first before any 
interrogation. You must remember that you are still in my 
hands." 
Show trials 
In 1979, the Indonesian government convened a kangaroo 
court in Bandar Acheh to try Harun Mahmud. Even the 
advocate who "defended" Mahmud was appointed by the 
regime. Mahmud's request to have a non-Indonesian lawyer 
from abroad was rejected. The reason was obvious: the Javanese 
were afraid their court procedures might be exposed to foreign 
lawyers, because there is no system of justice: anyone who can 
buy the judges, the lawyers and the generals will never be 
convicted of anything even if they are guilty. 
Two days before the trial of Harun Mahmud , we, the flag-
raisers group , were brought to the Military Police (CPM) and 
warned: "You must all testify against Harun Mahmud and 
condemn the National Liberation Front of Acheh ·Sumatra. If 
you do not cooperate , we will beat you again". 
On the day of the trial we were brought to the court in a 
mortuary vehicle to prevent people from seeing us and showing 
sympathy for us and for the liberation movement. The regime 
wanted to make me testify against Harun Mahmud. The entire 
court procedure was a set-up. They announced that the trial was 
public but no journalist was allowed to attend except those 
handpicked by the regime ; even they were not allowed to report 
the questions and answers truthfully. Loudspeakers were set up 
but the volume was reduced when questioning took place. And 
when anyone spoke against the regime , the mike went dead! 
There was never any doubt where the public stand: they 
enthusiastically supported the Free Acheh Movement. The 
judge asked me, "What is the goal of the National Liberation 
Front Acheh Sumatra?" But before I managed to answer him, an 
army officer stood up and yelled: "Questions relating to the aims 
and goal of the Free Acheh Movement may not be asked!" The 
microphone went dead, the judge kept quiet . And that was that. 
The "trial" of Harun Mahmood took one month . Every day 
we were brought to the court through the back door. The 
sessions lasted until late afternoon . We were always hungry 
because they kept us half starved. They gave us only a glass of 
tasteless tea for lunch . After the sessions, we were taken back to 
our small cell where we slept on the cement floor, hungry inside 
and eaten by the mosquitos outside. Harun Mahmud was 
accused of violating presidential decree No.11/1963 introduced 
by Sukarno long ago . Even by Javanese Indonesian standards it 
is illegal according to most lawyers. On the basis of the "law", 
Harun Mahmud was condemned to 6112 years imprisonment and 
ordered to pay costs to finance his torturers and the corrupt 
judges, headed by Din Muhammad. 
After the trial of Harun Mahmud, we nine were tried. I was 
given 4 years in jail; Ramli Hamzah, 3 years; Radja Rusen, 3 
years; Abdul Ghani, 3 years; Hasballah Lammuelo, 3 years; 
Abdul Manaf, 2 years; Tengku Hadji Adam, 1 year 9 months 
and 18 days (how meticulously weighted!); Miss Nurhanifah 
Hasan, 1 year; and Sabirin, 1 year. All including costs for the 
show trials! 
A civilian government prosecutor once said to me: "You are 
being brought to court for sentencing just for formality. 
Everything has been decided by Laksusda. We, the court, the 
government prosecutors are like loud-speakers for them. If we 
refused to do what the Laksus people order us, we will be treated 
like you, members of the Free Acheh Movement." 
Miss Nurhanifah Hasan and I refused to accept the court's 
verdict on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
condemn us inasmuch as it was the court of the illegal occupiers 
of our country. Only a properly constituted Achehnese Court 
can judge us. Javanese Indonesian courts have no jurisdiction in 
Acheh Sumatra. Our stand was based on International Law 
provisions that no colonial power has jurisdiction over a colonial 
territory. Indonesia claims jurisdiction over Acheh Sumatra on 
the basis of the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to it on December 
27 1949, which is also illegal. 
Our seven brothers accepted the court verdict because they 
were no longer able to suffer torture in jail. Because I refused to 
accept the verdict, I was kept in jail together with another 150 
Free Acheh prisoners some of whom had been there for three 
years without being brought to trial - even a show trial. 
On 12 April, 1981, I and several other colleagues managed to 
escape from the Indonesian Military Prison in Bandar Acheh. 
From Kuta Radja _(Bandar Acheh) we went to liberated territory 
under the control of the Government of the State of Acheh 
Sumatra. From there I manageq to go abroad and with the help 
of the United Nations was given political asylum in Sweden. We 
are grateful to the Swedish people and government. 
Viirmeland, Sweden March 7, 1983. 
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West Papua 
ABRl's 'social approach' in Irian Jaya 
Two reports sent to TAPOL this month on the current situation in West Papua provide an interesting analysis and ~escription 
of present-day Indonesia's policies aimed at pacifying and subduing the people of West Papua. One repor~ was writt~n by an 
OPM observer sent to the region late last year; the other was written by one of his contacts inside. Both are m Indonesian_. The 
following summarises the main conclusions and highlights some of the more striking accounts of life in Jayapura,_ the capital of 
Indonesia's 'province of Irian Jaya '. Apart from direct quotations, our summary draws together points made m each of the 
documents. 
"In order to retain hold of Irian Jaya, (the Indonesians) are 
adopting several approaches, namely: 
1. The approach of coaxing the (Papuan) community. 
2. The anthropological approach: studying the characteristics of 
each tribe in Irian, holding lectures by anthropologists and 
sociologists so as to facilitate approaches to communities in 
the interior. 
3. The educational approach: giving guidance to the community 
by mobilising people to support the Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution, to ensure that people think about nothing else. 
4. The approach through (informal) leaders of society. 
5. The approach through religion .. . " 
"The political mechanism in Irian Jaya, directed towards 
securing Indonesia's national stability, is now at the stage of 
manipulating Irianese society, using it, controlling it and super-
vising it; carrying out surveillance and taking care that it does not 
take action in pursuance of its own ideals. We point all this out 
not because we are unhappy with such a state of affairs; these are 
indeed facts and we are compelled to draw the conclusion that, 
however difficult the situation may be, endeavours to neutralise 
it must continue as one way of advancing the struggle. Without a 
great deal of hard work, nothing will be achieved." 
* * * * * Education 
Both reports stress that the Indonesian colonial administration is 
consistently striving to undermine the Christian-based schools. 
The schools in Irian Jaya are run by four educational institutions: 
the Protestant Educational Foundation (YPK), the Catholic 
Education Foundation (YPPK), the Islamic Educational Found-
ation (YAPIS), and Inpres ('presidential instruction' schools, 
funded by grants specially allocated on the instructions of the 
President). A great deal of energy and funds have been invested 
in the setting up of new schools. The quality of education offered 
at Inpres schools is good, and the teachers are paid higher salaries 
than in the Christian schools with the result that there is a 
tendency for children and teachers to shift from the latter to the 
former. However, the lnpres schools have a negative impact for 
Papuans and are being deliberately used to weaken schools run 
by Protestants and Catholics. In the past, these latter were the 
'key to progress' for Papuans. 'Political observers' (the term used 
in the original is pengamat politik, referring to people within the 
Indonesian administration) are well aware of this, and as a 
countervailing force, Inpres schools have been set up even in 
areas where Christian schools already exist, to entice pupils and 
teachers away; this also has the effect of impoverishing these 
schools. "In short," writes one of the reports, "educational 
policy is being specifically watched by political observers in order 
to put an end to such 'keys of progress' for the local people." 
Many Papuans now employed by the Indonesians and many of 
those leading the OPM are products of these schools. 
The non-lnpres schools depend to a large extent on the 
financial support of (Papuan) parents whose economic position is 
generally very weak. In some schools, pupils must travel long 
distances; public transport is lacking and is very expensive, and 
few Papuan families have transport of their own, so their children 
must walk to school. The children of 'newcomers' (the term used 
is pendatang, people from outside the region, in other words, 
Indonesians rather than Papuans), are brought to school by 
private transport. Another distinction which results in feelings of 
segragation and discrimination is the emphasis placed on the 
wearing of uniforms. In some schools children are required to 
wear different uniforms on different days of the week; for 
instance, a white top and a red skirt or trousers on Mondays, 
which is flag-raising day, to match the red-and-white Indonesian 
flag, and other types of uniforms during the rest of the week. This 
places the poorer Papuan children in a position of inferiority; 
some actually leave school out of a sense of shame. 
Cendrawasih University (UNCEN) 
The university is described as being the 'dapur' (kitchen) for 
methods to keep watch on people with pro-OPM sentiments; a 
thorough-going system of control and supervision has been 
devised which functions with the collaboration of the university 
staff and lecturers. The students, the vast majority of whom are 
Papuans, are closely watched. Yet nevertheless, "the spirit of 
patriotism flourishes like mushrooms". The vast majority of 
students are opposed to Indonesian rule. They cultivate the 
distinctive membesak culture, specific to Papuan people, as a way 
of encouraging their people to love and respect their own 
traditions, despite efforts by the Indonesian administration to 
destroy them. But in any case, most of those who graduate from 
UNCEN fail to get jobs because it is far easier for Indonesians 
from outside the region to get work with the government. 
In a section on the prevalence of prostitution in Jayapura, one 
of the reports points out that many girls and women involved are 
school pupils and university students trying to earn money to pay 
their school fees. 
Recruitment of Papuans to Leadership Roles 
All Papuans selected for positions of leadership must first 
undergo investigation to see whether they have an 'Irianese 
mentality' or an 'Indonesian mentality'. If their 'mentality' is in 
doubt, they cannot be appointed or can only hold token positions, 
under close scrutiny and control. There is a growing tendency to 
draw Papuans into positions of leadership, as department heads, 
district chiefs (bupati) and so on. In this way the administration 
hopes to redress the imbalance between Papuans and newcomers, 
and eliminate grounds for disquiet and resentment among 
Papuans because of the overwhelming predominance of Indo-
nesians. 
Papuans in positions of leadership are not allowed to develop 
concepts of their own about how things should be done. These 
must come from Indonesians, whereas the local official is 
required to use his/her status to implement concepts drawn up by 
others. 
A number of informal leaders such as ministers and priests 
have been placed in political positions, as members of the pro-
vincial assembly for instance. Their value lies in the fact that they 
enjoy the confidence of the community. But their political duties 
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force them to give up their pastoral duties, leaving communities 
without guidance. 
The Economy 
In Jayapura, Papuans are now heavily outnumbered by people 
from Indonesia, by roughly eight to one. One report describes 
Jayapura as a city badly polluted by refuse, while nothing is done 
to keep street surfaces clean. Little attention is paid to amenities. 
Drinking water supply completely dried up in some districts; as a 
result, a large number of Papuan women demonstrated outside 
the governor's office recently, banging their empty buckets. Most 
businesses and shops are owned by Macassarese who have gone 
into cattle-rearing, opened up timber works, estates and other 
industries. In many cases they took land from Papuans by force, 
but if the original owners dare challenge unlawful expropriation, 
ABRI invariably intervenes on the side of Macassarese. 
Irian Jaya still depends on rice imports. All rice supplies are 
controlled by Dolog, the regional distribution board, and the 
government trading corporation, Irian Bhakti. The rice imported 
is government-subsidised, but the only people entitled to alloca-
From Lord Ave bury, 
Chairman 
Parliamentary Human 
Rights Group: 
I have read West Papua: the Obliteration of 
a People with sadness and indignation. It is 
a sorry story of the betrayal of a small and 
defenceless people, who were first handed 
over from one set of colonialists to another 
by the United Nations themselves, and 
then ruthlessly exploited by multi-nationals 
which plundered their forests and mineral 
resources. If the West · Papuans had been 
granted a genuine free choice, instead of 
the transparent fraud perpetrated on them 
under that name, they would not have 
become part of Indonesia, and they would 
not have suffered the mass murders, im-
prisonment, economic repression and dis-
crimination which has been their lot since 
the herrenvolk from Java assumed power in 
1963. 
This account should be read by all con-
cerned with human rights. West Papua is 
not in the limelight, and the atrocities com-
mitted against her people have attracted 
very little attention. But as a case study of 
ruthless and cynical exploitation, the story 
unfolded here can have few parallels in the 
twentieth century world. No wonder Bri-
tain tries hard to conceal her sales of mili-
tary hardware to a regime which is capable 
of the offences against humanity catalogued 
here. 
Lord A vebury, 
House of Lords, London 
"With the publication of this book, 
T APOL has thorqughly justified its 
continued existence ... (its) political 
intent ... does not detract from the 
importance and power of its message. 
West Papua is valuable for both the casual 
and concerned observer of developments 
on the other side of the bord~r." 
PNG Times, 13th May, 1983 
tions are more senior government officials, mostly Indonesians, 
who also receive allocations of sugar, salt, coffee and other 
commodities. Marketed rice is closely supervised by Dolog; on 
the open market, it is sold at a much higher price. When sold into 
the interior, an additional levy is imposed for 'communications 
difficulties'. On the other hand, village products such as vege-
tables fetch only half the price they are sold for in urban areas. 
This double bind on village prices is forcing down living standards 
in the interior. 
Security 
Both reports decribe systematic efforts by ABRI to recruit 
intelligence agents among Papuans. When people are arrested 
for OPM sympathies, the ones who show less determination are 
often forced to accept release on condition that they are willing to 
spy for the government. One of the reports however says that this 
kind of intelligence recruitment is now getting less emphasis 
because many of the Papuans involved prove less than reliable as 
sources of information. Moreover, there is a tendency for policies 
Continued overleaf 
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to change drastically with each new military commander. 
ABRI is now using the 'social weapon' , the so-called human 
approach. The aim is to 'treat local communities nicely' by 
working through established social and religious networks, and 
by means of the 'ABRI-to-the-villages' programme, a 'civic 
mission '. Experience is· far from positive however; plenty of 
houses may be built but they don 't last long. Standards of con-
struction are shoddy, for instance, because the mortar or 
concrete mix is over-diluted. 
As with the intelligence service, there has been systematic 
recruitment of Papuans into the army and the police force. The 
intention is to create an 'Irianese army' for use against the OPM. 
However, many Papuan servicemen prove disloyal, so this 
recruitment is now being phased out, while those already in the 
services are being denied promotion. The intention was to set 
Papuans against Papuans. 
Imprisonment and Disappearances 
The report written by the person who was visiting from abroad 
says it was impossible to visit places of detention because the 
writer was often followed . Reports from contacts in the army and 
the police showed that prisons are filled to overflowing; the 
majority of prisoners are OPM supporters. The 'diehards' are 
kept in underground cells; some are known to have been 
'kidnapped' (diculik, meaning here, exterminated). Many 
prisoners who are released in order to engage in spying but who 
prove unsatisfactory are re-arrested, and then exterminated. 
One of the forms of extermination used is to bind and tie up 
the prisoner alive in a rice-sack which is then thrown into the 
ocean. On occasions, the bodies come to the surface in a few 
days. Two men subjected to such treatment were: 
Willem Yoko, a civil servant working at the Abepura District 
Office, from Nyao-Yosko, Jayapura; and 
Jonas Tu, also a civil servant, who worked at the Public Works 
Department in Abepura, who was from Ubrub, 
Jayapura. 
They were both bound up alive in sacks, then thrown into the 
ocean at Skyland, Abepura. Their decomposed bodies were 
washed up five days later. This incident occurred in 1982, at the 
time when three Papuan students at UNCEN were arrested for 
raising the West Papuan flag. (See TAPOL Bulletin No. 55, 
January 1983, for a report of their trial.) 
More on influx of Papuans into PNG 
Regarding the many West Papuans seeking refuge in PNG recently (see TAPOL Bulletin No 56, March 1983), the PNG Times (11th 
February 1983) reports that most were "in a bad state of health and require urgent medical treatment". Some walked hundreds of miles 
from Wissel Lakes and Bird's Head. The sudden upsurge is due to stepped up military operations, the paper says, though church officials 
in Irian Jaya also believe that "a large number of villagers from remote areas are moving east . . . because of 'sheer neglect' by the 
Indonesian authorities". 
Our last report referred to 'nucleus estates' being set up along the border. The Jakarta weekly Topik provides corroborative evidence 
of the disruptive effects of these palm-oil and rubber estates in an article published recently, which we summarise below: 
Civil servants working at government offices in Irian Jaya (the 
name used by Ind6lnesia for West Papua) are "joining the 'GPL' 
out of a sense of frustration and disappointment," reports the 
Jakarta weekly, Topik (18th April, 1983). (GPL is the desig-
nation used officially and in the Indonesian press for the Free 
Papua Movement, the OPM; GPL stands for 'wild disruptors 
gangs'. 
In a report that in effect testifies to systematic racism and dis-
crimation in Irian Jaya, Topik quotes a student at the Home 
Affairs Department Academy (APDN) in Jayapura as saying 
that people joining the resistance come not only from those em-
ployed in the private sector but from government employees as 
well. "The primary factor is a sense of disappointment," he said. 
Topik added that 'GPL' members consist mainly of people who 
feel that "they are being pushed out, not only by transmigrants 
(newcomers from Indonesia) but also by so-called "jungle mon-
sters (raksasa-raksasa hutan) who are blocking and taking control 
of the forests in a quite excessive way". The unfortunate thing, 
the journal adds, is that these "monsters" frequently resort to 
violence to achieve their aims. 
The APDN student who refused to give his name, men-
tioned one example of a civil servant working for the Academy 
who fled to join the resistance. "He was a native of the region 
who happens to have been extremely loyal to his department; he 
had worked there for ten years, rarely taking time off and fre-
quently coming to work even on holidays. He apparently very 
much wanted to be appointed to an official position in the 
Academy but this ambition was thwarted when a young new-
comer, a mere novice, was 'dropped' from Jakarta and was im-
mediately appointed to that post. This infuriated and disap-
pointed him, so he ran away (to join the resistance)." Such things 
frequently create problems, the same person said, "People here 
regard these newcomers (pendatang) as competitors, even foes." 
~tes Project Disrupts People's Lives 
Topik also reports that a government project called the Nucleus 
Estates project, involving the establishment of palm-oil estates in 
the Arso-Koya region of the district ofJ ayapura, has led to strong 
protests by local inhabitants. Initially, people were prepared to 
accept the project and received compensation for the uprooting 
of their sweet-potato and sago stands. But after a few months, a 
great deal of disquiet spread as people realised that replacement 
of sago and sweet potato plants by palm oil crops was having the 
effect of disrupting their livelihoods. They accused the govern-
ment of disruption and threatened to abandon the project if they 
were not provided with an alternative source of living. In words 
that suggest deliberate deception on the part of the district chief 
of Jayapura, Bas Youwe who provided Topik with information 
about this project, Topik goes on to say that the problem was 're-
solved' by proceeding with a transmigration project, "in response 
to the local people's demands (sic) and also in order to meet the 
need for a larger population. But the most important thing, said 
Bas, deceitfully (berkilah) was that the produce of the trans-
migrant community could be channelled.'" 
As for Papua.n attitudes towards transmigration, Topik quotes 
a local official as complaining that local opinion is guided largely 
by the position taken by tribal chiefs known as ondohoule. 
"The word of the ondohoule counts for much more than the word 
of the government. They are often under the influence of a 'third 
party' (this clearly refers to the OPM. TAPOL) which is why 
many projects planned by the government simply do not proceed 
as intended." 
West Papua: The Obliteration 
of a People 
Price: £2.50 plus postage 50 pence (UK, Europe 
and overseas surface): £2.00 (overseas air). 
Please send payment with order. 
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Bechtel-UK spends £125 millions of 
British taxpayers' money 
but workers go hungry 
On the east coast of Kalimantan, the Bech-
tel Corporation is involved in two construc-
tion projects on behalf of the Indonesian 
state oil company, Pertamina, a new oil 
refinery at Balikpapan and a natural gas 
installation at Bontang. Though Bechtel 
originates from the USA, (its former dir-
ectors include Caspar Weinberger, Philip 
Habib, ~nd George Schultz of the Reagan 
administration), it is the UK subsidiary 
which is involved in Balikpapan, in part 
paid for by a trade credit agreement from 
the British Government worth £125 million 
from the British aid budget (see TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 50, March 1982). This money 
also helps pay for goods and services from 
about a hundred other British companies 
supplying Bechtel, including Balfour 
Beatty and Farmers Boilers. 
Many of these projects are said to be 'vital' 
for the future of the Indonesian economy, 
and the region has been granted the status 
of a 'strategic area', meaning, amongst 
other things, that special policies apply for 
controlling the Jabour force. 
Kalimantan is a vast and still compara-
tively wild region, one of the last areas of 
primary forest in the world. With a scatter-
ed indigenous population, labour is scarce. 
Tens of thousands of workers are recruited 
from densely populated areas such as Java 
and Bali by Jabour subcontractors awarded 
permits under the regional migrant labour 
(AKAD) scheme of the Department of 
Manpower; these provide large companies 
with a Jabour force 'screened' to weed out 
'troublemakers'. Transmigration schemes 
have also brought thousands of families 
from Java to cultivate patches torn out of 
jungle and swamps; when their new crops 
fail, transmigrants help provide a reserve 
force of unskilled marginal labour. 
tary command for East Kalimantan (KO-
O AMIX/Mulawarman), Brigadier General 
Henri Santoso, LAKSUSDA (the local 
representative of KOPKAMTIB), said 
that, because of the many 'vital' projects in 
his region, labour problems need 'tight 
supervision'. Though labour actions were 
increasing, many had been "successfully 
overcome by the security forces taking 
preventative action", he said. Recent 
events on the Bechtel site at Balikpapan gi 
events on the Bechtel site at Balikpapan 
give us a good example of how this 'pre-
ventative action' by the Brigadier's troops 
works to the advantage of the Suharto 
regime and its foreign associates. 
Foreign companies are involved in many 
other large projects in East Kalimantan, 
including the Bunyu methanol plant (Lurgi 
of West Germany), the East Kalimantan 
fertilizer plant, many timber concessions, 
and a 750,000 ha. coal concession awarded 
to Rio Tinto Zinc and British Petroleum. 
Tight Supervision by the Military 
At Balikpapan Bechtel employs bet-
ween 7,000-9,000 workers, the vast major-
ity of them migrant workers on the AKAD 
scheme hired through its subcontractor, PT 
Puma Bina Indonesia. The migrant work-
ers are housed in two barracks, in J alan 
Minyak and Camp Telindung, where the 
workers live four to a room, four metres by 
four metres. 
In late 1982 the head of the regional mili-
,. 
Censorship on sticky • issues 
Jakarta 
Essential equipment for reading foreign newspapers in In-
donesia includes a pair of rubber gloves, tweezers and a power-
ful lamp .. 
It is common in Jakarta's hotel lobbies to see people try-
ing to peel apart the sticky pages of Time or Newsweek with 
ink-blackened finge"s. Others peer at fellow guests through 
a neatly cut hole on the front page. of The Asian Wall Street 
Journal or myopically hold the International Herald Tribune 
up to the light. 
The reason is censorship, which officially does not exist. 
Subscribers to the Hera'ld Tribune who telephoned the 
distributors to ask why they had not received their copy were 
told the entire issue had fallen victim to censorship and been 
banned by the attorney general's office. The reason was 
apparently an article on President Suharto's leadership style, 
reprinted from the Washington Post. 
Enterprising readers, wielding eyelash tweezers with sticky 
fingers, can often get clues to the offending articles from the 
odd words still legible under a mass of printer's ink. Others, 
their curiosity aroused, get copies under plain cover from 
abroad or photocopies from embassies. 
The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, both 
written and spoken, but the local press is bound by a "consen-
sus" with the government not to publish news which might 
inflame religious or ethnic sentiments, or other matters deemed 
sensitive. As foreign journalists are not included in this, the 
only way to control the inflow of their news into Indonesia is 
by censorship. 
Last May the government effectively banned seven foreign 
newspapers by not renewing their import licences-the Dutch 
NRG Hand6lsblad, the London Observer, Le Figaro, L j4urore 
...: 
and France-Soir from France, and Australia's Sydney Morn-
ing Herald and The Australian. 
Censorship of the foreign press still available is sometimes 
done haphazardly by importers. A recent Newsweek edition on 
Hongkong, for example, had its front cover completely blacken-
ed and papered over, apparently because it showed a street 
scene with many billboards and shop signs in Chinese 
characters. These have been banned in Indonesia since the 
abortive coup of 1965, which the government says was master-
minded by Beijing. 
Ironically, those responsible for blacking out the offending 
characters apparently cannot distinguish Chinese from 
Japanese or Korean script, which also suffer when they ap-
pear in pictures or advertisements. 
Importers of foreign magazines and newspapers are 
sometimes overzealous in self-censoring articles, but one com-
pany spokesman said if th~y always waited for a decision from 
the attorney general's office, subscribers would complain of 
late delivery. So they black out every Indonesian-datelined 
story and all script which could be Chinese. 
The local press also suffers censorship. Last year one daily 
newspaper and one national news magazine had their publica-
tion permits revoked for months for reporting general elec-
tion violence and carrying the unofficial election results. 
A new press law abolished the need for individual publica-
tions to obtain such permits but made it compulsory for a 
publishing company to have a general "licence for press 
publication." 
Critics of the new law say it strengthens the government's 
control over the national press. They say the government can 
now paralyze a company's entire operation, instead of just clos-
ing down one of its publications.· -:-Reuters_.. 
Asia Record, April 1983 
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Bechtel-UK 
The Bechtel workers were for a long 
t ime refused permission to form a trade 
union. Instead, in 1981, Pertamina, plus 
the LAKSUSDA, the Police, the local 
Directorate General for the Development 
and Protection ofManpower (Binalindung), 
and the East Kalimantan representatives of 
the All Indonesia Labour Federation 
(FBSI) had formed an 'early detection 
team ', designed to 'detect and defuse ' 
labour unrest. Clearly , this team did not 
meet with much success, for the workers 
continued to voice their grievances particu-
larly about the lack of a union, cramped 
housing, uncertainty over their medical 
insurance, unpaid food allowances (see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 49, January 1982), 
inadequate food supplies, and discrimina-
tion between 52 Filipino workers on the site 
and the Indonesian workers. By October 
1982 a trade union branch was at last 
formed , apparently headed by someone 
generally agreed by the workers. 
Bitter Complaints about Food Supplies 
The workers had long complained of ineffi-
ciency and corruption in the food catering 
subcontractor, PT Patra, a subsidiary of 
Pertamina. Bechtel was reported to pro-
vide all the raw materials to this company, 
who would then just cook and serve it . 
However, the food was virtually inedible, 
and often late or in short supply. For 
example, the workers said they often 
needed to recO{>k the meat to make it 
edible, but Bechtel did not allow cooking 
facilities in their barracks. Then in Febru-
ary 1982 the majority of local workers 
requested a money allowance instead. 
Bechtel refused, saying it could not then 
'control the nutrition of its workers' and 
that this would 'disturb working hours'. 
Later, Bechtel carried out a ballot, and 
6,000 out of 7 ,000 workers voted for a food 
allowance, yet still this did not get imple-
mented. 
Moreover, the food subcontractor 
operated only three lockets to serve 
lunches to 3,000 workers within the lunch 
break of one hour. Trouble flared up in the 
queues, with many workers not getting 
served. However, rather than put pressure 
on its subcontractor to improve services, 
Bechtel docked the wages of any worker 
late back from lunch, and allowed the mili~ 
tary to intervene. From mid-1982, troops 
from the Mobile Brigade (Brimobdak XII) 
were sent to supervise the workers inside 
the canteen! This canteen was described by 
the Head of Pertamina, Yudo Sumbono, on 
a personal visit , as a 'prison ', echoing the 
workers ' own description of themselves as 
'prisoners ' on this project. 
Protest Actions Confronted by Troops 
These smouldering issues reached crisis 
point twice during the second half of 1982. 
On 4th September, a member of the Mobile 
Brigade on duty in the canteen was stabbed 
in the shoulder after he had fired three 
warning shots over workers who had jeered 
at him. Then on 20th October, the evening 
meal was very late ; a worker who enquired 
was hit across the face with a metal ladle by 
the chief cook, and this sparked off rioting 
in the streets of Balikpapan until 4.30 a.m. 
When the food packets did arrive towards 
midnight, 3,000 workers threw them away; 
instead they entered the subcontractor's 
building and began distributing thousands 
of eggs. The next morning, the breakfast 
for those coming off the nightshift did not 
arrive until 10 a.m. Meanwhile two thou-
sand dayshift workers refused to go to 
work, joined by another thousand by lunch-
time. There followed two days of protest 
action, with workers using everything they 
could lay their hands on to write slogans 
such as 'Help Please, Hunger', and 'We 
Were Not Brought From Our Homelands 
To Be Hungry'. 
Meanwhile, the military stood at the 
ready and members of the army intelli-
gence in plain clothes took up positions at 
the entry and exit gates to the camp. The 
Bechtel site manager issued a circular 
declaring that workers not prepared to 
work should report to the time-keeping 
locket at Gate III; those who signed twice 
in 24 hours that they would remain in their 
barracks would have unspecified 'actions' 
I euvsEt ter r::I 
• I 
A guide to Indonesian labour and labour protest, labour studies and international 
solidarity with Indonesian workers is being published in May-June 1983. It is a special 
Indonesian issue of the Newsletter of International Labour Studies (NILS). 
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taken against them, but those who did not 
sign would be considered as having left 
their jobs. "This is how Bechtel in Balik-
papan passes judgement on our lives", 
replied one worker. Few of them signed. 
High level discussions were held at the 
Pertamina headquarters in Balikpapan, 
involving American Bechtel managers 
flown in from Jakarta, the Army, the 
Department of Manpower, and the union 
representative recently chosen by the 
workers but now declared unacceptable by 
them. Finally, after two days , the Bechtel 
workers were forced back to work. The 
military commander denied that ' trouble ' 
had occurred, but added, " If there were 
excesses, that is in the form of beatings, 
then this was the most appropriate measure 
against such a numerous mass gathering". 
LAKSUSDA investigated the cause of the 
strike , but seemed unable to find any evi-
dence that it was provoked by 'subversive 
elements'. 
A week later the food supplies were still 
not sorted out. Other subcontractors were 
found in Balikpapan, but they were not up 
to the task of feeding thousands of workers. 
Over two hundred workers went down with 
vomiting and diarrhoea, twelve of whom 
had to be hospitalised. Once again the 
newspapers reported 'restlessness' . 
According to Sinar Harapan , the food 
problems were caused by Pertamina, which 
was late in paying Bechtel which in turn was 
late in paying its subcontractor, a Perta-
mina subsidiary. Pertamina replied that it 
was up to Bechtel to pay, and then reclaim 
from Pertamina. These corporations enjoy 
huge revenues from worldwide oil sales 
plus millions of pounds from the British aid 
programme, yet cannot arrange to feed 
those· who work for them in hard and 
dangerous conditions. (*) 
Recently, Bechtel has begun to lay off 
workers. Construction is due to end this 
year, and thousands of workers will be 
thrown out of work. 
Sources; Merdeka 24.5.82, 10.10.82; 
Kompas 23/24.10.82; Pedoman Rakyat 
26.11. 82; Indonesian Times 25 .10. 82; Pikir-
an Rakyat 24.10.82; Sinar Harapan 11.9.82 
21/22/23/25/26/27/28/29/30.10.82, 7.4.83 
Financial Times 1.2.82 
* 
Further research reveals that PT Puma Bina 
Indonesia, Bechtel's ' labour subcontractor', is in 
fact a joint stock company owned by Bechtel it-
self. Moreover, PT Potra Supplies, the disgrace-
ful food subcontractor, is listed in a British 
Embassy document as a British company . 
Copies from NILS , Galileistr. 130, 2561 
The Hague 
Price: US$1.40 (individuals); US$3.10 
(organisations) . 
Orders must be accompanied with cash. 
An Indonesian multinational 
The Liem empire 
The vast business empire of Liem Sioe Liong, whose interests are 
intimately linked with Suharto's rise to power, have been ana-
lysed in detail in a cover story in the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (7th April, 1983). Under the protection of the military 
government and helped along by numerous favours and 
concessions, the Liem family has built up a huge conglomer-
ate of companies which cover financial services (among others, 
Indonesia's largest private domestic banking corporation, Bank 
Central Asia), manufacturing and construction, and trading. 
The FEER report was published in the wake of burgeon-
ing investments by the Liem family in Singapore, Hongkong, the 
Netherlands and California. These include the takeover of a 
number of companies in Hongkong, the purchase of Hibernia, 
one of California's eight largest banks, and a bid to buy up 
Hegemeyer, a large Dutch trading company. These overseas 
investments were criticised earlier this year by a Jakarta -
based business daily, Jurnal Ekuin, which has since been 
banned.Jurnal Ekuin, which referred to Liem as "the richest 
businessman in Indonesia", apparently stung the authorities by 
complaining about this flight of capital, saying that at a time when 
a huge balance of payments deficit was threatening the country's 
economy, "rich Indonesians of Chinese descent are busy taking 
their personal funds out of the country". The publication even 
hinted that the flight abroad mught signal preparations for a 
major move of funds out of the country at a time when Suharto 
was approaching what could be his final term as president. 
A very different interpretation could however be made, 
namely that Liem 's rapidly growing offshore investments are 
based on a renewed sense of certainty about the longterm future 
of the military regime, in line with the consolidation of Suharto's 
position that has become evident since last year's general 
elections. 
Liem and Suharto 
Liem Sioe Liong, a first-generation Chinese who came to Indo-
nesia in 1916, started trading operations in CentralJava in the late 
1940s in a peanut company run by his uncle. He soon became 
major supplier to the Diponegoro Division, with which he sub-
sequently began to operate army-backed enterprises to help fund 
the division and its officers. This cemented a longterm relation-
ship with Suharto, an officer with the division and its commander 
from 1956 to 1959. 
By 1966, after the overthrow of Sukarno, the Liem group 
already had a complex network of companies engaged in trade, 
banking and manufacturing. With the he!p of lucrative con-
cessions, "reflecting", as FEER puts it, "Suharto's trust in Liem" 
the business group really took off. It grew rapidly, helped on by 
profits from monopoly or semi-monopoly concessions in cloves 
Kompas 26-3-1983 
(an important ingredient in Indonesian-style kretek cigarettes) 
and flour. The cloves monopoly was shared with Probosutedjo, 
Suharto's step-brother, and profits were used among other things 
to finance the state-owned aircraft company, PT Nurtanio which 
now assembles helicopters under licence from Casa of Spain. 
The Liem-controlled flour company, Bogasari which also 
incorporates Suharto family interests, was granted sole 
flour-milling operations with exclusive handling rights in 
Indonesia, plus exclusive marketing rights in western Indonesia 
which accounts for eighty per cent of domestic flour con-
sumption. A Liem-owned textile company, PT Tarumatex, won a 
$1.7 million contract to supply clothes for the military with-
out a tender, despite Department of Industry objections that the 
company was unable to meet the contract terms. The group's 
cement interests, centred in Indocement, now account for 38 per 
cent of the industry's domestic capacity. 
The Liem group, in which Liem Sioe Liong's son and heir-
apparent, Anthony Salim, now plays the leading role, also has 
major holdings in property, construction, investment banking, 
motor-car assembly (most of it in joint ventures with Japanese 
companies ) and sole distribution agencies, as well as mineral ex-
traction (coal-mining), food production and life assurance. 
There are close tie-ups between the Liem and Suharto families 
at numerous points in addition to the clove and flour ventures. 
For example Liem shares a fifty percent holding in a major pro-
perty development project with the Kencana complex, one of the 
largest business groups in Indonesia with major Suharto family 
interests. One of Liem's four main cement projects is a joint ven-
ture with the Sahid group, led by Sukamdani Gitesardjono, a rel-
ative of Suharto's. 
Longterm confidence 
The Liem group's extensive enterests in a number of longterm in-
vestment projects inside Indonesia, some of which could take 
seven to ten years to amortise, are a sign of the group's con-
fidence in the future of its supporting prop, the military govern-
ment under Suharto and his close associates. The uninterrupted 
growth of Liem's business interests since the 1950s and in par-
ticular since the mid sixties is a striking example of the close inter-
meshing between the military government and some highly select-
ive business interests which have enjoyed protection and favours 
from the man who stands at the pinnacle of the system, General 
Suharto. 
h 
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A profile of General Benny Murdani 
2nd October 1932, Leonardus Benyamin Murdani was born in 
Cepu, Central Java, the son of a Javanese railway mechanic and a 
woman of Javanese-German parentage. Catholic. 
1945 He completed his primary school education. Some claims 
are now being made that he fought briefly with guerrillas as a 
schoolboy, though this is probably to create the impression that 
he took part in the anti-Dutch struggle. 
1950 He abandoned junior high school in the second grade and 
entered the Anny Officers ' Training Centre (Pusat Pendidikan 
Perwira Angkatan Darat) in Bandung. Graduates from this 
school, the first Anny educational centre , would later become the 
so-called 'bridging generation' between the '1945 generation' of 
officers and the younger generation of officers trained at the 
Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN), and subsequently Akabri, the 
Armed Forces Academy which now combines basic officer 
training for all the forces . This 'bridging generation' would be 
seen as playing a crucial role in the 1980s in securing 'orderly 
succession' from Suharto to the younger officers. 
1952 After a year's class work and a year as instuctor, he joined a 
combat squad with the rank of sargeant-major, and was assigned 
to a unit with the West Java Siliwangi Division. 
1954 He became a commissioned officer. In January, he volun-
teered as a trainer with the newly-established Army Command 
Corps (Korps Komando AD) , later to become known as the 
RPKAD, the paratroop regiment. (In recent years, RPKAD has 
been given the more elegant, Sanskrit-sounding name, Kopas-
sandha.) 
1956-1958 As an RPKAD company commander with the rank of 
first lieutenant, he took part in military operations against the 
Darul Islam in West Java and against regional dissident 
movements in Sumatra (PRRI) and North Sulawesi (Pennesta). 
1958 By now a captain in the RPKAD, he was sent to the US 
The man appointed in March this year as 
Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(ABRI) and Commander of the Army's 
security command, KOPKAMTIB, is a 
paratroop commander with long experience 
in intelligence work, and a history of 
diplomatic intrigue in Malaysia and South 
Korea. 
where he received amphibious operational training at the Little 
Creek naval base in Norfolk, Virginia. 
1962 He was sent to eastern Indonesia on operations with the 
Mandala theatre of war, under the command of Suharto, then a 
brigadier-general and commander of the Strategic Reserve 
Command (KOSTRAD). The Mandala had been set up to wage 
military operations against the Dutch, then still in occupation of 
West Papua. This is the starting point of his continuing collabora-
tion with Suharto. 
January 1962 He gained public acclaim as a 'hero' for leading a 
company of paratroops dropped near Merauke in the south-east 
of West Papua then Dutch West New Guinea. Of the 215 troops 
dropped, only eighty survived. Dispersed over an area wide of 
the target, they took two months to re-assemble. Murdani was 
reputedly planning an assault on Merauke in mid-August when a 
ceasefire between Indonesia and Holland was announced, 
following the New York Agreement of 15th August 1962. For his 
exploits in West Papua, Murdani was awarded the top decoration 
for bravery, the Bintang Sakti although in fact he was never 
engaged in combat. 
August-September 1964 As a member of the OPSUS (Special 
Operations) team of Ali Murtopo, operating under Suharto's 
guidance, he made secret contacts with Malaysian and British 
officials to subvert Sukarno's policy of confrontation with 
Malaysia. In the guise of a Garuda Indonesian Airways ticket-
clerk in Bangkok, he headed the permanent liaison team set up 
by Murtopo to handle this secret operation. This was the time 
when OPSUS also established contact with leaders of the CIA-
backed PRRI-Permesta uprisings who were living in exile in 
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. 
June 1965 He moved to the staff of KOSTRAD, still under 
Suharto's command, and became an officer with its General Staff 
II. It was here that he commenced his career in military intelli-
gence operations when he was appointed Assistant r, in charge of 
KOSTRAD's intelligence. 
August 1966 By now a major, he served as liaison officer in 
charge of arranging for the end of confrontation with Malaysia. 
He was then appointed charge d'affaires and later deputy head of 
mission at Indonesia's embassy in Kuala Lumpur. 
1971 He was appointed consul-general in South Korea, and later 
took charge of the Indonesian embassy in Seoul as charge 
d'affaires. His being dispatched to Seoul was apparently on the 
advice of US contacts, to give him the opportunity to study So•1th 
Korea's highly efficient system of repression, imposed at a time 
when the country was undergoing rapid economic development. 
During his stay in Seoul he is known to have struck up a long-
standing friendship with a South Korean army officer, Chun 
Doo-hwan, who, like Murdani, has a military career which 
combines paratroop and intelligence operations. Chun Doo-
hwan became President of South Korea in May 1980, a few 
months after the assassination of President Park and the 'purging 
coup' which removed a number of top-level army officers from 
key positions in South Korea. 
January 1974 He was suddenly recalled to Jakarta ten days after 
16 TAPOL Bulletin No. 57. May 1983 
the mid-January student demonstrations that had been badly 
disrupted by provocations organised by Ali Murtopo. As large 
numbers of students were arrested and being subjected to inten-
sive interrogations, he was placed in command ofKOPKAMTIB 's 
Special Tasks (Satgas) intelligence unit that took charge of these 
interrogations. Six months later, he was appointed Assistant I 
(Intelligence) at the Department· of Defence and Security, a 
position that he was to hold uninterruptedly until March 1983 
when he was appointed ABRI commander. It is probably from 
this point on that he begins to shift away from and outstrip his 
patron, Ali Murtopo, placing himself in a much more powerful 
independent position in the military hierarchy. Whilst holding 
key Army intelligence positions, he retains his crucial link with 
the so-called 'RPKAD-mafia', thus combining intelligence and 
operational roles. Like other RPKAD officers, Murdani's mili-
tary career has never included any tour of duty as an officer with a 
territorial division, giving him single-minded loyalty to a troop 
that is known to have a strong esprit de corps. 
August 1975 He was put in charge of military preparations for the 
invasion of East Timor. He and other senior combat officers 
pressed Suharto to take the 'military option' as against the 'intel-
ligence operation' being masterminded by Ali Murtopo and his 
OPSUS team. 
7th December 1975 He commanded the 30,000 Indonesian troops 
which invaded and captured Dili, the capital of East Timor, and 
launched a wave of terror in the town. He went on to command 
the ruthless campaign of terror against the people of East Timor 
resulting in the death of an estimated one-third (200,000 people) 
of the population. 
1977 He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. At 45, 
he was the youngest officer to have attained this rank under the 
New Order. 
End 1977 He was appointed head of the Strategic Intelligence 
Centre. 
May 1978 He became deputy head ofBakin, the state intelligence 
coordinating body which brings together the intelligence 
operations of all the Armed Forces. He was also put in charge of 
intelligence at KOPKAMTIB. During the course of this year, he 
was put in charge of several other major operations, among them 
the central government's team "for the development of East 
Timor". He is thus responsible not only for the military destruct-
ion of East Timor but also for the disruption and manipulation of 
that country's economy. He acknowledges the fact that he has 
been nicknamed "the two-headed monster of East Timor". 
He was also put in charge of the government's team to handle 
Vietnamese refugees in Indonesia. 
1979-1980 He was in charge of negotiations to purchase recon-
ditioned jet fighters from Israel for the Indonesian Air Force, a 
deal which, according to some sources, won him a commission of 
at least 5 per cent. This deal has never been publicly acknow-
ledged in Indonesia because of the negative impact on Muslims. 
His role in this deal would lend credibility to claims that close 
working relations have also been established between Indonesia's 
BAKIN and Israel's Mossad. 
Around this time he also made two secret visits to Hanoi on 
foreign affairs missions, much to the annoyance of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry. 
March 1981 He directed the operation to storm the hijacked 
Garuda plane at Bangkok's international airport during which 
four of the five hijackers were killed. The fifth man, captured 
alive and apparently unharmed, was dead by the next day when 
all five bodies were flown to Jakarta. According to press reports 
at the time, Israeli sources gave advice for this storming opera-
tion. 
March 1983 He was appointed commander-in-chief of the Armed 
Forces and concurrently commander of KOPKAMTIB, the 
Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and 
Order, in the reshuffle of cabinet ministers and Armed Forces 
leadership announced by Suharto after his appoitment as presi-
dent for a fourth term. For the first time under the New Order 
(since 1965), the posts of Minister of Defence and Security and 
Armed Forces commander are separated, which gives Murdani a 
far more powerful operational role, as he is unencumbered with 
the administrative and general policy functions that go along with 
the post of Defence Minister. 
* * * * ·* In "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" (April 1982) 
published in Indonesia (Cornell University), Murdani was de-
scribed as "the most redoubtable figure in the (interstitial genera-
tion) of what might be called the 'RPKAD mafia' ... arguably the 
second most powerful man in Indonesia". David Jenkins in 
FEER (21st April, 1983) refers to him as "a fighting man" with a 
long history in the RPKAD, Indonesia's 'praetorian guard'. 
Tempo (2nd April, 1983) describes his appointment as Armed 
Forces commander as "the bridge between the 1945 generation 
and the younger generation (graduates of Akabri, the Armed 
Forces Academy)". The journal also sees his appointment as a 
move to ensure a smooth transition from the one generation to 
the other, guaranteeing continuity in the leadership of the 
Indonesian state. 
INDONESIA OCTOBER 1965 
I told my story to the stones 
the gutters ran with tears 
the very houses sweated blood 
and were stained red for years 
but when I told it to The Times 
I got a haughty stare 
they had a lot of other news 
more suitable for their 
Top People; and the Guardian 
thought it 'Worth no reply; 
a murdered half-a-million, 
all innocent, to die 
was not their idea of the facts 
they really ought to print. 
It might only trouble their 
readers intelligent. 
Corpses in the rivers 
dead bodies everywhere, 
the C.I.A. had passed that way 
and none that year would say them nay. 
They closed their eyes and looked away. 
Arthur Clegg 
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Guest column. Part II 
Militarisation and equipping ABRI 
by: Hendrik Amahorseja 
(The first part of this article was published in TAPOL Bulletin No 56, March 1983. We repeat the last paragraph relating to Table 3, which 
was not included in the last issue.) 
Army Equipment (continued) 
Apart from the aircraft and helicopters shown in Table 3, the Army 
also possesses a number of transport ships and Landing Craft 
Utilities. Last December, two LCUs under construction for the 
Army were launched in TanjungPriok (Koja Dock). These vessels 
are number41 and42; they are 32.80metres long, 8.50metres wide 
with a speed of 10 knots. In the middle of 1982, the Territorial 
Command received an additional 77 V-22 type high-speed motor-
boats with a carrying capacity each of 14 soldiers. 
Table 3 
Aircraft 
Number Type 
2 C-47 Planes 
1 Aerocomander Planes 
1 DHC2 Planes 
1 Beach 18 Planes 
18 Gelatik Planes 
16 Bell 205 Helicopters 
5 Alloute III Helicopters 
16 B0-105 Helicopters 
Source: Pacific Defence Reporter, Dec/Jan 1982, and other 
sources including Indonesian newspapers. 
The Air Force 
The Indonesian Air Force has altogether 26,000 members. In 
general, its planes (Table 4) and helicopters (Table 5) are located 
in Java. In mid-1982, the Nurtanio company in Bandung received 
orders from the Air Force for 32 CN-235 aircraft and seven Puma 
SA-330s. Ass~mbling of these aircraft by N urtanio comes under a 
deal concluded between Spain and the Suharto regime (1). It has 
also been reported that in the 1983/84 financial year, the Air 
Force will acquire Hercules transport/supply aircraft that can 
deliver fuel to other aircraft in mid-air. 
Table 4 
Number 
14 
12 
4 
2 
8* 
16 
16 
18 
1 
l 
12 
1 
8 
6 
7 
12 
4 
16 
12 
4 
16 
2 
3 
20 
2 
1 
Aeroplanes 
Type 
A-14 
F-SE 
F-SF 
SkyhawkTA-4 
HS Hawk 
CA-27 Avon Sabre 
OV-lOF 
C-130H-30/-130B 
L-100-30 
C-140 · J etstar 
C-47 
Skyvan 
F-27 
CASA C-212 
DHC-3 
Cessna 207 /401/402 
T-46 
T-34Cl 
Hawk· T-53 
AS-202 Bravo 
A-4E 
TA-4H 
Transall C-160 
AS-20 
King Air 
Boeing 707 
Remarks 
from Israel 
from Israel 
Table 5 
Number 
2 
4 
1 
16 
13 
25 
12 
Helicopters 
Type 
Bell204B 
UH-340 
S-61A 
B0-105 
Puma SA-330 
Bell47 
Hughes500 
Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982 as well as Indonesian 
newspapers and other sources. 
The Navy 
There are 40,000 men in the Indonesian Navy, plus 13,000 in the 
Marine Corps (KKO) and 1,500 in the Navy's air wing. The main 
naval bases are in Surabaya, Jakarta and Gorontalo. In addition 
to warships (Table 6), the Navy possesses four submarines, two 
of which are type-209 from West Germany and two are W-class 
subs from the Soviet Union. 
Table 6 
Number 
4 
3 
3 
5 
1 
5 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
2 
6 
4 
3 
1* 
13 
5 
38 
Type 
US-Jones 
Fatahilla 
Riga 
Kronshtadt 
USPC-461 
Kraljevica 
Kelabang 
Attack 
USPGM-39 
PSSM MKS 
Liirsen lNC-45 
Spear 
Carpentaria 
T-43 
Corvettes 
? 
LST 
LCU 
LCM 
FAC(M) 
FAC(T) 
Remarks 
from USSR 
from USSR 
from Jugoslavia 
from USSR 
delivered by 
Holland in 
1981 & 1982 
from Australia 
Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan, 1982 and other sources includ-
ing Indonesian newspapers. 
*This vessel, called Sigalu, bears the number 857. It is 32.50 metres long, 
6.09 metres wide and has a speed of20 knots. Crew: three officers, 14 non-
commissioned officers and 6 other ranks. 
Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982, as well as Indonesian 
newspapers and other sources. 
* Another 4 to be delivered by British Aerospace. In addition, arrange-
ments for the purchase of five more Hawks are now under way. See 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 54, January, 1983. 
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The Marines (KKO) 
The Marines consists of about six infantry battalions, one auxil-
iary regiment and three amphibious battalions equipped with 
light tanks and APCs. The Marines are armed with 40 mm 
cannons for air defence. In December 1982, a new KKO corps 
named "Jala Mengkara" was inaugurated. It has the special task 
of defending vital off-shore projects. 
The Air Wing of the Navy 
In addition to its existing aircraft (Table 7), the Navy's air wing is 
to be reinforced with three Boeing 737s. One of these aircraft is 
already undergoing trials in Indonesia. After these trials have 
been completed, the aircraft will be sent back to the USA to be 
fitted with electronic equipment. 
Table 7 
Number 
20 
6 
3 
3 
Naval Aircraft 
Type 
Nomad 
CASA C-212 
C-47 
Aero Commander 
Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982, as well as Indonesian 
newspapers and other sources. 
The Navy also possesses a number of helicopters, including five 
HU-16s, 6 Allouette II/Ill and 4 B0-105s. 
There has been a sharp increase in the money spent by the 
State on the modernisation and re-epuipping of Suharto's 
military Forces. In the 1978/1979 State budget, the Defence and 
National Security allocation was sixty-five billion rupiahs (2), but 
in 1983/1984, a year in which the wages of civil servants have been 
frozen, food subsidies withdrawn and fuel subsidies greatly 
reduced, there are no economies on expenditure for Defence and 
Security, which has been allocated 574 billion rupiahs in the 
budget (3). This does not include military assistance from abroad 
or various domestic financial contributions, for example, from 
Pertamina. 
Colonialism and Javanisation 
The growth of militarisation taking place under the Suharto 
military regime is rooted in colonialism. The aggression against 
East Timor and the annexation of that country are well known 
internationally. But some basic historical facts need to be re-
called regarding internal practices. During the Dutch colonial 
era, populations in the various parts of the Dutch colonial empire 
were classified into several categories. Today, under Suharto's 
New Order era, these traditions of colonialism have been pre-
served, though somewhat modified. Indonesian citizens are 
classified into "the natives" (pribumi) and the "non-natives" 
(non-pribumi) such as the ChiRese and others not of "pure" 
Indonesian birth. But these are not the only categories. If we 
examine certain ethnic and geographical practices since the 
military regime came to power, it is clearly apparent that the role 
of the non-Javanese has been on the decline in all fields of 
government administration, at the centre of state power as well as 
in the regions. This is most clearly apparent within ABRI. About 
ninety per cent of senior positions in ABRI are now held by 
Javanese officers. ( 4) The same applies to members of ABRI who 
have been appointed by Suharto to the two legislative chambers, 
the DPR and the MPR. Not only are they all officers of the rank 
of colonel or higher. In addition, they are all from Java. (5) This is 
not a coincidence; it is inseparable from the political strategy of 
the Suharto regime and its supporters at home and abroad. 
At a time when the economic situation is deteriorating, when 
earnings from exports are falling and foreign debts are increasing 
and when many social problems are intensifying, General 
Suharto will certainly continue to pursue his so-called "smiling 
policy" in such forms as regeneration of the ABRlleadership and 
personnel used in other state sectors. As with similar policies in 
the past, this is solely aimed at prolonging the life of the Suharto 
regime. There will be no fundamental change in Indonesian 
society. Anyone who raises demands for democratisation and 
presses for the implementation of basic human rights will con-
tinue to be accused of engaging in criminal or subversive activity. 
Footnotes 
1 Under a new deal with Textron Inc. (USA), announced in late 1982, 
Nurtanio is to co-produce one hundred Bell Model 412 helicopters for 
military and commercial use. (Asia Monitor, Vol. VI, No. 4, Fourth 
Quarter, 1982. 6/4) 
2 Kompas, 11th January, 1978. 
3 Kompas, 7th January, 1983. 
4 Indonesia No. 33 (April) 1982. Cornell University, USA. 
5 See list of names ofDPR and MPR members appointed to represent 
ABRI, in Presidential Decision No. 150/M, 1982, and the names listed 
in Presidential Decision No. 151/M, 1982, dated 14th September 1982. 
Students warned: Criticising P4 is subversive 
Indonesian students in West Berlin, under pressure from the 
Indonesian Consulate-General in West Berlin for so-called 
'subversive activities', have pressed the Indonesian authorities 
very hard to give a public account of the reasons for this intimida-
tion. As we reported in our last issue, several Indonesian students 
have had their passports renewed for only six months instead of 
the normal two years as a warning that they are under official 
surveillance. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 56, March 1983, page 11) 
Board members of the West Berlin branch of the overseas 
students association, Perhimpunan Pe/ajar Indonesia (PPI) asked 
for a discussion with officials of the Consulate-General. The 
discussion took place on 16th March (see Majalah Gotong-
Royong, early 1983, no date, page 39-42, for a Protocol of the 
meeting). Asked for the criteria for deciding whether someone 
had acted 'against the national interests' (the pretext that has 
been used for refusing to renew passports longer than six 
months), an official said that national security covers a wide 
range of activities including ideology as well as social and cultural, 
national defence and security affairs. The authorities were 
concerned, he said, that criticisms being made by students 
overseas were 'soiling Indonesia's good reputation' and 
'obstructing relations with West Germany'. The official referred 
specifically to newsletters published in West Berlin by another 
overseas Indonesian organisation, Perhimpunan Indonesia in its 
publication entitledBerita TanahAirwhichhad, he said, distorted 
the decision adopted in 1978 by the People's Assembly (MPR) 
concerning Pancasila indoctrination courses, the so-called P4 
courses. Such 'distortion', the students were told, is 'an act of 
subversion', and the man in charge of the publication, I Gusti 
N joman Aryana, should not be surprised if his passport is 
renewed for only three months, or withdrawn altogether. 
The offending Berita Tanah Air report which appeared on 
20th February 1983 (Newsletter No. 15) challenged the way P4 
courses were being used to 'impose likemindedness' among 
Indonesians (seimbang-serasi-selaras) and as an attempt to 
eliminate conflict in Indonesian society. The Newsletter pointed 
to the role of conflict in the popular Javanese epic dramas such as 
the Baharata Yudha, and to the conflict of interests between 
workers and employers. It also quoted Maqdir Ismail, an LBH 
lawyer in Indonesia as saying: 
The P4 courses are aimed at making people act and speak alike: they 
are, to put it crudely, aimed at turning people into yesmen. They 
destroy creativity because people are 'chained' to what the government 
has defined as being the line. Everyone must think and act in a way that 
supports the status quo. 
The item, "Indonesian Students Could Lose Passports" in 
TAPOL Bulletin No 56, March 1983, was based on reports 
published in Berita dan Analisa, March 1983, published by PPI 
Berlin. We apologise for not mentioning the source at tM time. 
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Lawyers protest at accord between judges and prosecutors 
A meeting held in Jakarta last month to " establish closer 
harmony and cooperation between the Supreme Court, judges 
and public prosecutors has evoked strong protest from lawyers. 
Typical of this angry response is a statement by Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, chairman of the Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes, 
who stressed that "people seeking justice can only suffer if these 
ments he said had indeed tended towards executive interference 
' ' in the judiciary. . 
people reach accord" . , 
The meeting was convened by the Supreme Court chairman , 
Mudjono, the Justice Minister Ali Said, and the Attomey-
General Ismael Saleh. A new composite term , makehja has been 
coined to symbolise this three-way collaboration. 'Ma ' stands for 
Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court), 'keh ' stands for Kehakiman 
(Justice Ministry) and 'ja' stands for Jaksa Agung (Attomey-
General) . The four-day get-together was thus called the First 
Makehja Working Meeting. 
" If top-level accord between Jaw-enforcement agencies 
continues, the ones to suffer will be those seeking justice from the 
courts." He was particularly worried by the prospect that the 
courts would seek accord with the government in cases where 
people were suing the government for damages when, for 
instance, land expropriations had occurred. 
Responding to these protests, the Justice Minister Ali Said 
claimed that the meeting had been held to standardise interpreta-
tion of the new Procedural Code (KUHAP 1981 ). " If that is their 
purpose, why did they not invite lawyers and barristers to take 
part ," retorted Buyung. Another lawyer, Albert Hasibuan , 
agreed. "The articles of KUHAP are absolutely clear, " he said , 
" and there is no need for anyone to interpret them." He feared 
the consequences if makehja collaboration became institution-
alised . 
Buyung said he feared that such coordination would put an 
end to any independence for the judges, in particular in their 
interpretation of the law. "Jurisprudence constantly develops 
and changes, and it is out of the question for interpretations of the 
law to be laid down in a meeting of this nature. " Recent develop-
Source: Tempo. 25th April, 1983 
Book review 
Continued from page 7 
collaborators is functional to the regime : 
they are allowed to exist and to voice their 
criticisms (up to a point) in order to be 
overruled, thus deflecting criticisms of the 
system as a whole . The authors stress that 
their use of the term 'critical collaborator' 
is not pejorative and make a point of 
expressing their admiration for the LBH. 
But despite their express intentions, the 
choice of terminology is to say the least 
unfortunate. For a European reader in 
particular, the expression cannot fail to 
have negative connotations associated with 
the experience of the Second World War 
and no amount of authorial intention can 
remove them. Clearly, the LBH's appeal to 
principles of law is powerless in the face of 
the New Order's perversion of even the 
most elementary principles of justice. 
Clearly it is powerless in any conflict with 
KOPKAMTIB and its massive resources, 
financial and otherwise. Functionally, it 
may well be true that the LBH exists in 
order to be overruled, but does that destroy 
the moral value of its stance? Or its impor-
tance for any campaign based upon a de-
mand for human rights in Indonesia? 
Guide to a Labyrintban 'Legal' System 
Injustice is by no means an invention of the 
Suharto regime. Despite his anti-colonialist 
nationalist rhetoric, Sukarno adopted the 
framework of Dutch colonial law intact , 
even adding two anti-subversion decrees to 
the legal armoury he inherited. These were 
subsequently ratified by Suharto and in-
voked to obtain death sentences during the 
GJOS trials. Conveniently, 'subversion' 
20 
remains so ill-defined as to mean virtually 
anything the regime wishes it to mean. Like 
the PKI itself, subversion functions as a 
catch-all category to be invoked with 
deadly effect in the magical ceremonies of 
event creation . If the New Order can re-
cuperate colonial law to such effect, how 
much more easily can it adapt Javanese 
political tradition to its own ends. Thus, 
Suharto, like Sukarno before him, becomes 
the physical embodiment of the Pancasila, 
the Ratu Adil or Just Prince of tradition . 
The power of the Ratu Adil requires no 
justification or foundation in law: on the 
contrary, law proceeds from his person. 
Criticism of his actions is by definition sub-
versive and therefore illegal. 
The great strength of this study lies in its 
use of documentation and of material which 
is not readily available. It is a clear guide to 
the complexities of a frequently labyrinth-
an ' legal' system. Appendices provide a 
comprehensive survey of basic law and 
security legislation , together with the text 
of decrees establishing the Extraordinary 
Military Tribunal and other documents . 
The historical account of the New Order 
regime weaves together legislative and 
political history with eye witness accounts 
of torture , imprisonment and violence from 
tapols, students and Islamic militants. 
Accounts of the horrors of the system will 
not , sad to say, be unfamiliar to readers of 
TAPOL Bulletin. What may be less famil-
iar is the working of the system as a whole . 
The account of the growth and powers of 
KOPKAMTIB provides a valuable addi-
tion to the available literature on contem-
porary Indonesia. As a guidebook to the 
nightmare system of Suharto's New Order, 
Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror is 
indispensable. 
David Macey 
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